A problem for causal theories of reasons and rationalizations

Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):307-321 (1993)
Is causation either necessary or sufficient (or both) to make a belief-desire pair the reason for which one acts? In this paper I argue in support of a negative answer to this question, and thus attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the causal theorists. I also provide an outline of a different account of reasons and rationalization. Motivating my inquiry is a concern to show that ordinary ascriptions of reasons are not hostage to future accounts of how the brain works
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1993.tb01723.x
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Anne Jaap Jacobson (2005). Is the Brain a Memory Box? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):271-278.

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