A problem for naturalizing epistemologies

Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):31-49 (1992)
Every epistemological theory needs to be able to articulate some version of the following principle: If S's belief "q" is to make S's belief "p" justified (or is to make "p" something S knows), then "q" must possess some positive epistemic merit. This paper argues that naturalizing epistemologies do not have access to this principle. The central problem is that of providing a naturalistic account of the notion of a reason-for-which one believes while avoiding internalist commitments. The discussion, which focuses on the work of Alvin Goldman, is part of a general argument against causal accounts of reasons-for-which.
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb00645.x
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Anne Jaap Jacobson (2005). Is the Brain a Memory Box? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):271-278.

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