A powers theory of modality: or, how I learned to stop worrying and reject possible worlds

Philosophical Studies 151 (2):227-248 (2010)
Possible worlds, concrete or abstract as you like, are irrelevant to the truthmakers for modality—or so I shall argue in this paper. First, I present the neo-Humean picture of modality, and explain why those who accept it deny a common sense view of modality. Second, I present what I take to be the most pressing objection to the neo-Humean account, one that, I argue, applies equally well to any theory that grounds modality in possible worlds. Third, I present an alternative, properties-based theory of modality and explore several specific ways to flesh the general proposal out, including my favored version, the powers theory. And, fourth, I offer a powers semantics for counterfactuals that each version of the properties-based theory of modality can accept, mutatis mutandis. Together with a definition of possibility and necessity in terms of counterfactuals, the powers semantics of counterfactuals generates a semantics for modality that appeals to causal powers and not possible worlds.
Keywords Metaphysics  Modality  Powers  Dispositions
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9427-1
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David Yates (2014). Dispositionalism and the Modal Operators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):411-424.

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