David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 151 (2):227-248 (2010)
Possible worlds, concrete or abstract as you like, are irrelevant to the truthmakers for modality—or so I shall argue in this paper. First, I present the neo-Humean picture of modality, and explain why those who accept it deny a common sense view of modality. Second, I present what I take to be the most pressing objection to the neo-Humean account, one that, I argue, applies equally well to any theory that grounds modality in possible worlds. Third, I present an alternative, properties-based theory of modality and explore several specific ways to flesh the general proposal out, including my favored version, the powers theory. And, fourth, I offer a powers semantics for counterfactuals that each version of the properties-based theory of modality can accept, mutatis mutandis. Together with a definition of possibility and necessity in terms of counterfactuals, the powers semantics of counterfactuals generates a semantics for modality that appeals to causal powers and not possible worlds.
|Keywords||Metaphysics Modality Powers Dispositions|
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References found in this work BETA
Alexander Bird (2007). Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford University Press.
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Wang (2015). The Modal Limits of Dispositionalism. Noûs 49 (3):454-469.
Timothy Perrine (2015). Undermining Truthmaker Theory. Synthese 192 (1):185-200.
David Yates (2014). Dispositionalism and the Modal Operators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):411-424.
Travis Dumsday (2012). Dispositions, Primitive Activities, and Essentially Active Objects. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):43-64.
David Manley (2012). Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):321 - 334.
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