A slightly radical neuron doctrine
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):840-841 (1999)
| Abstract | The element of truth in behaviorism tells us that some versions of a radical neuron doctrine must be false. However, the representational nature of many mental states implies that neuroscience may well bear on some topics traditionally addressed by philosophers of mind. An example is the individuation of belief states. | |||||||||
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