Bocheński on property identity and the refutation of universals

Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (3):293 - 316 (2006)
Abstract
An argument against multiply instantiable universals is considered in neglected essays by Stanislaw Lesniewski and I.M. Bochenski. Bochenski further applies Lesniewski's refutation of universals by maintaining that identity principles for individuals must be different than property identity principles. Lesniewski's argument is formalized for purposes of exact criticism and shown to involve both a hidden vicious circularity in the form of impredicative definitions and explicit self-defeating consequences. Syntactical restrictions on Leibnizian indiscernibility of identicals are recommended to forestall Lesniewski's paradox
Keywords Bochenski, I.M.  Leibniz’s Law  Lesniewski, S.  identity principle  individual  ontic individualism  property  property identity  universal
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