Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (3):293 - 316 (2006)
|Abstract||An argument against multiply instantiable universals is considered in neglected essays by Stanislaw Lesniewski and I.M. Bochenski. Bochenski further applies Lesniewski's refutation of universals by maintaining that identity principles for individuals must be different than property identity principles. Lesniewski's argument is formalized for purposes of exact criticism and shown to involve both a hidden vicious circularity in the form of impredicative definitions and explicit self-defeating consequences. Syntactical restrictions on Leibnizian indiscernibility of identicals are recommended to forestall Lesniewski's paradox|
|Keywords||Bochenski, I.M. Leibniz’s Law Lesniewski, S. identity principle individual ontic individualism property property identity universal|
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