Colour for representationalists

Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):169--85 (2007)
Abstract
Redness is the property that makes things look red in normal circumstances. That seems obvious enough. But then colour is whatever property does that job: a certain reflectance profile as it might be. Redness is the property something is represented to have when it looks red. That seems obvious enough. But looking red does not represent that which looks red as having a certain reflectance profile. What should we say about this antinomy and how does our answer impact on the contest between realism and subjectivism about colour? I address the issues through the lens of a representationalist position on colour experience
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (2004). Representation and Experience. In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. 107--124.
Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
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