David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):315-326 (2010)
Tarski avoids the liar paradox by relativizing truth and falsehood to particular languages and forbidding the predication to sentences in a language of truth or falsehood by any sentences belonging to the same language. The Tarski truth-schemata stratify an object-language and indefinitely ascending hierarchy of meta-languages in which the truth or falsehood of sentences in a language can only be asserted or denied in a higher-order meta-language. However, Tarski’s statement of the truth-schemata themselves involve general truth functions, and in particular the biconditional, defined in terms of truth conditions involving truth values standardly displayed in a truth table. Consistently with his semantic program, all such truth values should also be relativized to particular languages for Tarski. The objection thus points toward the more interesting problem of Tarski’s concept of the exact status of truth predications in a general logic of sentential connectives. Tarski’s three-part solution to the circularity objection which he anticipates is discussed and refuted in detail.
|Keywords||Circularity Language, meta-language Semantics Tarski, Alfred Truth|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Hartry Field (1972). Tarski's Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 64 (13):347-375.
A. Gupta (1993). A Critique of Deflationism. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):57-81.
Volker Halbach (1999). Disquotationalism and Infinite Conjunctions. Mind 108 (429):1-22.
Jaakko Hintikka (1975). A Counterexample to Tarski-Type Truth-Definitions as Applied to Natural Languages. Philosophia 5 (3):207-212.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Donald Davidson (1994). What is Quine's View of Truth? Inquiry 37 (4):437 – 440.
Richard C. Jennings (1987). Tarski - a Dilemma. Inquiry 30 (1 & 2):155 – 172.
John F. Fox (1989). What Were Tarski's Truth-Definitions For? History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (2):165-179.
Greg Frost-Arnold (2004). Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism? History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):265-280.
Peter Milne (1999). Tarski on Truth and its Definition. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99:141-167.
Jaakko Hintikka (2000). What Is True and False About So-Called Theories of Truth? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:155-160.
Panu Raatikainen (2003). More on Putnam and Tarski. Synthese 135 (1):37 - 47.
Luis Fernández Moreno (2001). Tarskian Truth and the Correspondence Theory. Synthese 126 (1-2):123 - 147.
David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (1999). Tarski on “Essentially Richer” Metalanguages. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):1-28.
Peter Milne (1999). Tarski, Truth and Model Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):141–167.
Added to index2009-11-07
Total downloads61 ( #24,893 of 1,101,681 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #23,343 of 1,101,681 )
How can I increase my downloads?