In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9. Philosophy Doc Ctr (2000)
|Abstract||There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s pure teleosemantic theory; then to present two objections; and finally to ask the question whether a teleosemantic framework can be saved from the objections|
|Keywords||Intentionality Dretske, F Fodor, J|
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