David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):91-98 (2007)
The liar paradox is standardly supposed to arise from three conditions: classical bivalent truth value semantics, the Tarskian truth schema, and the formal constructability of a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. Standard solutions to the paradox, beginning most notably with Tarski, try to forestall the paradox by rejecting or weakening one or more of these three conditions. It is argued that all efforts to avoid the liar paradox by watering down any of the three assumptions suffers serious disadvantages that are at least as undesirable as the liar paradox itself. Instead, a new solution is proposed that admits that if the liar sentence is true then it is false, in the first paradox dilemma horn, but denies that the liar sentence is true, but asserting instead that it is false, and refuting the second paradox dilemma horn according to which it is supposed to follow that if the liar sentence is false then it is true. The reasoning for the second paradox dilemma horn is flawed, in that is not only not supported by but actually contradicted by the Tarskian truth schema. We could only infer the second dilemma horn if it were to clasically follow from the assumption that the liar sentence is false, and from the three liar paradox conditions, that therefore it is false that the liar sentence is false. This entire sentence can be shown to be false on the basis of the standard truth schema, thus blocking the paradox. Alternative formulations of the liar sentence are discussed, and the formal proofs and counterproofs for the two paradox dilemma horns, are considered along with the further philosophical implications of maintaining a resolute stance that the liar sentence is simply false
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Bradley Dowden, Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jordan Howard Sobel, On the Storeyed Revenge of Strengthened Liars, and the Contrary Finality of No-Proposition Resolutions.
J. C. Beall (ed.) (2007). Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Matt Leonard (2012). Burge's Contextual Theory of Truth and the Super-Liar Paradox. In Michal Pelis Vit Puncochar (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2011. College Publications.
Greg Littmann (2012). Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):15-27.
Ahmed Alwishah & David Sanson (2009). The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Paradox in the Islamic World From the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Thirteenth Centuries Ce. Vivarium (1):97-127.
Matti Eklund (2007). The Liar Paradox, Expressibility, Possible Languages. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Patrick Greenough (2011). Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547 - 563.
Wojciech Żełaniec (2004). New Considerations on The 'Liar' Paradox. Filozofia Nauki 2.
Dale Jacquette (2010). Liar Paradox and Substitution Into Intensional Contexts. Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):119-147.
Patrick Greenough (2001). Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2):115 - 135.
Jason Zarri (2010). A Dilemma for Dialetheism. The Dualist 15 (Spring):21-31.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1979). The Lessons of the Liar. Theory and Decision 11 (1):55-70.
Adam Rieger (2001). The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 54 (2):195-203.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads14 ( #120,382 of 1,101,833 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #91,766 of 1,101,833 )
How can I increase my downloads?