David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159 (2010)
It is argued that experiences are complex events that befall their subjects. Each experience has a single subject and depends on the state or the event that it is of. The constituents of an experience are (or underlie) its subject, its grounding event or state, and everything that the subject is aware of during that time that's relevant to the telling of the story of how it was to participate in that event or be put in that state. The experience occurs where the person having the experience is. An experience of an event or state occurs when that event or state makes a difference to its possessor's conscious life, where this difference is either a matter of really knowing what's happening or merely a matter of being affected
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (2005). Perception and Representation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1981). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected Philosophical Papers Vol. Ii. Basil Blackwell.
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Citations of this work BETA
Greg Janzen (2011). In Defense of the What-It-is-Likeness of Experience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.
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