Erkenntnis. v. 44, no. 3: pp. 317-26
| Abstract | Radical Interpretation and the Permutation Principle * Davidson has argued1 that there is no fact of the matter as to what any speaker's words refer to because, even holding truth conditions fixed, a radical interpreter will always be able to come up with many equally good interpretations of the interpretee’s language. This conclusion, which Davidson (following Quine) refers to as the "inscrutability of reference", has caused many to reject the radical interpretation methodology as fundamentally flawed.2 Nevertheless, it isn’t clear that such widespread inscrutability is a necessary consequence of the radical interpretation methodology. In particular, Davidson claims that the following assumption (which will hereafter be referred to as the "Permutation Principle") is "clearly needed if we are to conclude to the inscrutability of reference". | |||||||||
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Henry Jackman (1996). Radical Interpretation and the Permutation Principle. Erkenntnis 44 (3):317-326.
Matti Eklund (2007). The Ontological Significance of Inscrutability. Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):115-134.
J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Permutations and Foster Problems: Two Puzzles or One? Ratio 21 (1):91–105.
Jonathan Ellis (forthcoming). The Relevance of Radical Interpretation. In J. Malpas (ed.), The Hermeneutic Davidson. MIT Press.
Chuang Ye (2008). The Limit of Charity and Agreement. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (1):99-122.
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J. E. Malpas (1989). Ontological Relativity in Quine and Davidson. Grazer Philosophische Studien 36:157-178.
Robert Sinclair (2002). What is Radical Interpretation? Davidson, Fodor, and the Naturalization of Philosophy. Inquiry 45 (2):161-184.
Ye Chuang (2008). The Limit of Charity and Agreement. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (1):99 - 122.
John R. Cook (2009). Mindblindness and Radical Interpretation in Davidson. Analecta Hermeneutica 1:15-34.
Peter D. Klein (1986). Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Donald Davidson (2001). Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation: Philosophical Essays Volume 2. Clarendon Press.
Piers Rawling (2003). Radical Interpretation. In Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
H. G. Callaway (1988). Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditional Semantics. Erkenntnis 28 (1):3 - 27.
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