David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphysica 12 (1):51-72 (2011)
This essay offers a detailed philosophical criticism of Frege’s popular thesis that identity is a relation of names. I consider Frege’s position as articulated both in ‘On Sense and Reference’, and in the Grundgesetze, where he appears to take an objectual view of identity, arguing that in both cases Frege is clearly committed to the proposition that identity is a relation holding between names, on the grounds that two different things can never be identical. A counterexample to Frege’s thesis is considered, and a positive thesis is developed according to which, in contradistinction to the Fregean position, identity is a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relation holding only between a thing and itself which can be expressed as a relation between names
|Keywords||Frege, Gottlob: identity Metaphysics Names, naming Semantic theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Gordon P. Baker (1984). Frege, Logical Excavations. Oxford University Press.
Wolfgang Carl (1994). Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origins and Scope. Cambridge University Press.
Michael A. E. Dummett (1981). The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Martin Hahn (1995). The Frege Puzzle One More Time. In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer. 169--183.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Stavroula Glezakos (2009). Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle? In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 202.
Robert May (2012). What Frege's Theory of Identity is Not. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):41-48.
John Justice (2002). Mill-Frege Compatibalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:567-576.
Massimiliano Carrara & Elisabetta Sacchi (2007). Cardinality and Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):539 - 556.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1998). A Fregean Principle. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3):125-135.
Kai F. Wehmeier (2012). How to Live Without Identity—And Why. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):761 - 777.
Mark Textor (2007). Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended. Mind 116 (464):947-982.
Gottlob Frege (2010). On Sense and Reference. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 36--56.
Gideon Makin (2010). Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):147-163.
William J. Greenberg (1996). The Paradox of Identity. Epistemologia (2):207-226.
P. W. Hanks (2011). Structured Propositions as Types. Mind 120 (477):11-52.
Added to index2011-05-13
Total downloads96 ( #18,348 of 1,696,171 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #60,870 of 1,696,171 )
How can I increase my downloads?