Forrester's Paradox

Dialogue 25 (4):761- (1986)
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Abstract

In “Gentle Murder, Or The Adverbial Samaritan”, James William Forrester presents what he describes as “the most powerful version yet put forward” of Lennart Åqvist's Good Samaritan paradox in deontic logic. Forrester suggests that the paradox may make it necessary to reject the standard deontic inference principle. This desperate conclusion, as Forrester acknowledges, would imply that all of standard deontic logic “must be in a bad way”. But Forrester's “paradox” is not nearly so deep or intractable as he maintains.

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Gentle murder, or the adverbial samaritan.James William Forrester - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):193-197.

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