David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 37 (3):415-429 (2009)
Berkeley’s capacity to conceive of mind-independent bodies was corrupted by his theory of representation. He thought that representation of things outside the mind depended on resemblance. Since ideas can resemble nothing than ideas, and all ideas are mind dependent, he concluded that we couldn’t form ideas of mind-independent bodies. More generally, he thought that we had no inner resembling proxies for mind-independent bodies, and so we couldn’t even form a notion of such things. Because conception is a suggestible faculty, Berkeley’s arguments actually made it the case that he himself couldn’t conceive of mind-independent bodies.
|Keywords||Berkeley Resemblance Conception Idea Notion Master argument|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Smalligan Marusic (2009). Comments on Michael Jacovides “How Berkeley Corrupted His Capacity to Conceive”. Philosophia 37 (3):431-436.
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Michael Jacovides (2009). Remarks on Smalligan Marusic's Comments. Philosophia 37 (3):437-439.
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