How Berkeley corrupted his capacity to conceive

Philosophia 37 (3):415-429 (2009)
Abstract
Berkeley’s capacity to conceive of mind-independent bodies was corrupted by his theory of representation. He thought that representation of things outside the mind depended on resemblance. Since ideas can resemble nothing than ideas, and all ideas are mind dependent, he concluded that we couldn’t form ideas of mind-independent bodies. More generally, he thought that we had no inner resembling proxies for mind-independent bodies, and so we couldn’t even form a notion of such things. Because conception is a suggestible faculty, Berkeley’s arguments actually made it the case that he himself couldn’t conceive of mind-independent bodies.
Keywords Berkeley  Resemblance  Conception  Idea  Notion  Master argument
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Robert Merrihew Adams (1973). Berkeley's “Notion” of Spiritual Substance. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 55 (1):47-69.
    Jonathan Bennett (1982). A Note on Interpretation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (4):753 - 755.

    View all 16 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    35 ( #41,655 of 1,088,398 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    5 ( #20,058 of 1,088,398 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.