How Is Descartes' Argument against Scepticism Better than Putnam's?

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):593 - 612 (2007)
'If a person can think of an F, then that person has come into causal contact with an F in the right way' is a premise in an obvious reconstruction of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats. 'If a person can think of an F, then that person has come into causal contact with an F or with something at least as good as an F' is the only controversial premise in Descartes' argument for the existence of God. Putnam's principle entails Descartes', which suggests that we should enquire after better versions of Putnam's proof. I present three variations and conclude that Putnam's semantic theory does not have anti-sceptical consequences. In contrast, given Descartes' cognitive situation, he was perfectly justified in accepting the soundness of his argument for the existence of God
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Paul A. Boghossian (1997). What the Externalist Can Know A Priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):161-75.
    Keith DeRose (2000). How Can We Know That We're Not Brains in Vats? Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.
    Keith S. Donnellan (1974). Speaking of Nothing. Philosophical Review 83 (1):3-31.
    Andr Gallois (1996). Externalism and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):1-26.

    View all 13 references

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    53 ( #25,200 of 1,089,047 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,722 of 1,089,047 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.