David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003)
Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth century. ‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word. It derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives from the verb intendere, which means being directed towards some goal or thing. The entry falls into eleven sections
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Elay Shech (2015). Scientific Misrepresentation and Guides to Ontology: The Need for Representational Code and Contents. Synthese 192 (11):3463-3485.
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Einar Aadland (2010). Values in Professional Practice: Towards a Critical Reflective Methodology. Journal of Business Ethics 97 (3):461-472.
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