In defense of folk psychology

Philosophical Studies 59 (1):31-54 (1990)
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Abstract

It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires.

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Author Profiles

Philip Pettit
Australian National University
Frank Jackson
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Group agency and supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.
How beliefs are like colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7889-7918.
Folk psychology as a model.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-16.

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References found in this work

Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David Lewis - 1972 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Propositional attitudes.Jerry Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.

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