David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognition 79 (1):161-196 (2001)
Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology
|Keywords||*Cognitive Processes *Consciousness States *Introspection *Theories|
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Citations of this work BETA
Daniel M. Haybron (2007). Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall. Noûs 41 (3):394–428.
Josh Weisberg (2011). Misrepresenting Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.
Nicholas Shea (2012). Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):307-344.
Nicholas Shea & Cecilia Heyes (2010). Metamemory as Evidence of Animal Consciousness: The Type That Does the Trick. Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):95-110.
Simone Kühn & Marcel Brass (2009). Retrospective Construction of the Judgement of Free Choice. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):12-21.
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