Kripke and the mind-body problem

Dialectica 41 (4):293-300 (1987)
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Abstract

SummaryMind‐body identity theories are standardly supposed to be logically contingent. Kripke defends a quasi‐Cartesian property dualism by observing that bodies and minds or mental and neurophysiological events or event‐types can always be assigned distinct rigid designators. The concept of rigid designation implies that possibly nonidentical rigidly designated bodies and minds are necessarily and therefore actually nonidentical. But Kripke's argument does not refute materialist reductions that affirm the actual identity of minds and bodies while admitting only the possible nonidentity of ncwigidly designated mental and material entities. This limits the adequate expression of contingent materialist theories, but does not defeat materialism per se. The mind‐body problem like other genuine ontological issues resists stipulative semantic‐philosophical resolution

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