Online research in philosophy

Commonsense psychology and cognitive science both regularly assume the existence of representational states. I propose a naturalistic theory of representation sufficient to meet the pretheoretical constraints of a "folk theory of representation", constraints including the capacities for accuracy and inaccuracy, selectivity of proper objects of representation, perspective, articulation, and "efficacy" or content-determined functionality. The proposed model states that a representing device is a device which changes state when information is received over multiple information channels originating at a single source. The changed state of a representing device is a representation. The unitary information source which would give rise to the information impinging on the representing device, and hence, give rise to the representation, is the content of the representation. The model meets the pretheoretic constraints, and also conforms to available neurobiological data for two invertebrate species.

The paper uses ideas from Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence and Genetic Algorithms to provide a model of the development of a fight-or-flight response in a simulated agent. The modelled development process involves (simulated) processes of evolution, learning and representation development. The main value of the model is that it provides an illustration of how simple learning processes may lead to the formation of structures which can be given a representational interpretation. It also shows how these may form the infrastructure for closely-coupled agent/environment interaction.

It has been argued that neural networks and other forms of analog computation may transcend the limits of Turing-machine computation; proofs have been offered on both sides, subject to differing assumptions. In this article I argue that the important comparisons between the two models of computation are not so much mathematical as epistemological. The Turing-machine model makes assumptions about information representation and processing that are badly matched to the realities of natural computation (information representation and processing in or inspired by natural systems). This points to the need for new models of computation addressing issues orthogonal to those that have occupied the traditional theory of computation.

Drawing on philosophy, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, Simple Minds explores the construction of the mind from the matter of the brain.

From an object-oriented perspective, this paper investigates the interdisciplinary aspects of problem representation as well the differences between representation of problems in the mind and that in the machine. By defining an object as a combination of a symbol-structure and its associated operations, it shows how the representation of problems can become related to control, which conducts the search in finding a solution. Different types of representation of problems in the machine are classified into four categories, and in a similar way four distinct models are distinguished for the representation of problems in the mind. The concept of layered hierarchies, as the main theme of the object-oriented paradigm, is used to examine the implications of problem representation in the mind for improving the representation of problems in the machine.

How can the human mind represent the external world? What is thought, and can it be studied scientifically? Does it help to think of the mind as a kind of machine? Tim Crane sets out to answer questions like these in a lively and straightforward way, presuming no prior knowledge of philosophy or related disciplines. Since its first publication in 1995, The Mechanical Mind has introduced thousands of people to some of the most important ideas in contemporary philosophy of mind. Tim Crane explains some fundamental ideas that cut across philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science: what the mind-body problem is; what a computer is and how it works; what thoughts are and how computers and minds might have them. He examines different models of the mind from dualist to eliminativist, and questions whether there can be thought without language and whether the mind is subject to the same causal lsaws as natural phenomena. The result is a fascinating exploration of the theories and arguments surrounding the notions of thought and representation. The edition has been fully revised and updated, and includes a new chapter on consciousness and new sections on modularity and evolutionary psychology. There are also guides for further reading, a chronology and a new glossary of terms such as mentalese, connectionism and the homonculus fallacy. The Mechanical Mind is accessible to the general reader as well as students, and anyone interested in the mechanism of our minds.