Lewis on intentionality
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):199 – 212 (2004)
| Abstract | David Lewis's account of intentionality is a version of what he calls 'global descriptivism'. The rough idea is that the correct interpretation of one's total theory is the one (among the admissible interpretations) that come closest to making it true. I give an exposition of this account, as I understand it, and try to bring out some of its consequences. I argue that there is a tension between Lewis's global descriptivism and his rejection of a linguistic account of the intentionality of thought. I distinguish some different senses in which Lewis's theory might permit, or be committed to, a kind of holism about intentional content, and I consider the sense in which Lewis's account might be said to be an internalist account, and the motivation for this kind of internalism. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Descriptivism Intentionality Internalism Metaphysics Thought Lewis, D | |||||||||
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