Mind and illusion

In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 421--442 (2003)
Much of the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind is concerned with the clash between certain strongly held intuitions and what science tells us about the mind and its relation to the world. What science tells us about the mind points strongly towards some version or other of physicalism. The intuitions, in one way or another, suggest that there is something seriously incomplete about any purely physical story about the mind
Keywords Knowledge  Minds  Physicalism  Representationalism
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246100008365
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