Modal realism with overlap

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):137 – 152 (2004)
In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal realism with overlap , the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has several interesting features: (i) it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of spacetime and material objects; (ii) it is committed to compositional pluralism , which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and (iii) it is the modal analogue of endurantism , which is the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each moment they are located.
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DOI 10.1080/713659792
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Ross Cameron (2009). What's Metaphysical About Metaphysical Necessity? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):1 - 16.
Kris McDaniel (2010). Parts and Wholes. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):412-425.
Stephan Torre (2011). The Open Future. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):360-373.

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