Philsophical Studies 131 (1):227-249 (2006)
|Abstract||Physicalists are committed to the determination without remainder of the psychological by the physical, but are they committed to this determination being a priori? This paper distinguishes this question understood de dicto from this question understood de re, argues that understood de re the answer is yes in a way that leaves open the answer to the question understood de dicto|
|Keywords||A Priori De Re Dualism Metaphysics Physicalism De Dicto|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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