Mind and Language 26 (4):468-481 (2011)
|Abstract||How should we react to the contention that there is empirical evidence showing that many judge Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge, contrary to the verdict of most analytical philosophers about these cases? I argue that there is no single answer to this question. The discussion is set inside a view about how to view the role and significance of intuitive responses to some of philosophy's famous thought experiments. One take-home message is that experimental philosophy and conceptual analysis are not as far apart as is often thought|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alan Musgrave (2012). Getting Over Gettier. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.
Jim Stone (2013). 'Unlucky' Gettier Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):421-430.
John Turri (2013). A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the Test. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (10).
John Turri (2012). Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do? Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
Jennifer Nagel (2012). Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar (2013). Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs. Cognition 129:652-661.
Jennifer Nagel (2012). Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Jessica Brown (2011). Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence. Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
Brian Weatherson (2003). What Good Are Counterexamples? Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman (2012). The Folk Conception of Knowledge. Cognition 124 (3).
Igor Douven (2005). A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):207-228.
Brent G. Kyle (2013). Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.
Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743 - 747.
Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743-747.
Added to index2011-09-07
Total downloads115 ( #5,909 of 722,933 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 722,933 )
How can I increase my downloads?