On Gettier Holdouts

Mind and Language 26 (4):468-481 (2011)
Abstract
How should we react to the contention that there is empirical evidence showing that many judge Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge, contrary to the verdict of most analytical philosophers about these cases? I argue that there is no single answer to this question. The discussion is set inside a view about how to view the role and significance of intuitive responses to some of philosophy's famous thought experiments. One take-home message is that experimental philosophy and conceptual analysis are not as far apart as is often thought
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    References found in this work BETA
    Simon Cullen (2010). Survey-Driven Romanticism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.
    Ian Hacking (1995). The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

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