David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1977)
What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between mediate and immediate perception receive detailed defences and the author criticises attempts to reduce perceiving the believing and to show that the Representative theory makes the external world unknowable. Jackson recognises that his views are unfashionable but argues in detail that they are to be preferred to their currently favoured competitors. It will become an obvious point of reference for all future work on the philosophy of perception.
|Keywords||Appearance Color Epistemic Immediacy Mental Object Metaphysics Perception Representative Realism Science Seeing Sense Data Thing Armstrong, D Price Smart, J|
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Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
William E. S. McNeill (2012). On Seeing That Someone is Angry. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.
David Bourget (2015). Representationalism, Perceptual Distortion and the Limits of Phenomenal Concepts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
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