Psychological explanation and implicit theory
Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):83-95 (2000)
| Abstract | I offer an account of the relation between explanations of behaviour in terms of psychological states and explanations in terms of neural states that: makes it transparent how they can be true together; explains why explanations in terms of psychological states are characteristically of behaviour described in general and relational terms, and explains why certain sorts of neurological investigations undermine psychological explanations of behaviour, while others leave them intact. In the course of the argument, I offer an account of implicit theories | |||||||||
| Keywords | Behavior Explanation Implicit Mental Psychology Science | |||||||||
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