David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):127 – 140 (1993)
Abstract An examination of John Pollock's theory of artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind raises difficulties for his mechanist concept of person. Token physicalism, agent materialism, and strong artificial intelligence are so related that if the first two propositions are not well?established, then there is no justification for believing that an artificial consciousness can be designed and built. Pollock's arguments are shown to be inconclusive in upholding a functionalist theory of persons as supervenient but purely physical entities. In part this is the result of Pollock's thin definition of the concept of supervenience, according to which any complex supervenes on its proper parts. The limitations of this account are apparent when contrasted with richer conceptions of supervenience, such as Joseph Margolis?. But on Margolis? theory, the mind and its expressions supervene on or rise above their material embodiments in the sense that they cannot be fully explained in physical terms, which contradicts Pollock's token physicalism and agent materialism. The consequence for Pollock's project to explain the mind as mechanical, and to manufacture artificial persons, is that these systems can at best aspire to impressive innovations in weak artificial intelligence, but realistically cannot aspire to strong or mentalistic artificial intelligence
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Roderick Chisholm (1966). Freedom and Action. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Random House.
Roderick Chisholm (1976). The Agent as Cause. In M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel. 199-211.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John Mark Bishop (2003). Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Rajakishore Nath (2009). Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: A Critique of the Mechanistic Theory of Mind. Universal Publishers.
Mariusz Flasiński (1997). "Every Man in His Notions" or Alchemists' Discussion on Artificial Intelligence. Foundations of Science 2 (1):107-121.
Gerard Casey (1988). Artificial Intelligence and Wittgenstein. Philosophical Studies 32:156-175.
Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2000). Consciousness, Intentionality, and Intelligence: Some Foundational Issues for Artificial Intelligence. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (3):263-277.
Ausonio Marras (1993). Pollock on How to Build a Person. Dialogue 32 (3):595-605.
John L. Pollock (1988). My Brother, the Machine. Noûs 22 (June):173-211.
John L. Pollock (1990). Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:461-498.
Added to index2009-02-01
Total downloads3 ( #334,035 of 1,410,159 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #177,870 of 1,410,159 )
How can I increase my downloads?