David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The Monist 94 (1):81-102 (2011)
I explore two accounts of properties within a dispositional essentialist (or causal powers) framework, the pure powers view and the powerful qualities view. I ﬁrst attempt to clarify precisely what the pure powers view is, and then raise objections to it. I then present the powerful qualities view and, in order to avoid a common misconception, oﬀer a restatement of it that I shall call the truthmaker view. I end by brieﬂy defending the truthmaker view against objections.
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Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (2013). Properties: Qualities, Powers, or Both? Dialectica 67 (1):55-80.
John Henry Taylor (2013). Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together. Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.
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