Representation and narrow belief
Philosophical Issues 13 (1):99-112 (2003)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | Belief Metaphysics Mind Narrow Representation Twin Earth | |||||||||
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