David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 44 (3):317-326 (1996)
Davidson has claimed that to conclude that reference is inscrutable, one must assume that "If some theory of truth... is satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence... then any theory that is generated from the first theory by a permutation will also be satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence." However, given that theories of truth are not directly read off the world, but rather serve as parts of larger theories of behavior, this assumption is far from self-evident. A proper understanding of the role truth theories play in theories of interpretation makes the inscrutability of reference much less wide-spread than Davidson suggests, and, as a result, the radical interpretation methodology is much less likely to saddle its defenders with counterintuitive cases of indeterminacy than is commonly supposed
|Keywords||Indeterminacy Interpretation Language Reference Truth Davidson, D|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Hilary Putnam (1975). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Michael Devitt (1991). Realism and Truth. B. Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Gaskin (2011). Reference and the Permutation Argument. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):295-309.
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