Erkenntnis 44 (3):317-326 (1996)
|Abstract||Davidson has claimed that to conclude that reference is inscrutable, one must assume that "If some theory of truth... is satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence... then any theory that is generated from the first theory by a permutation will also be satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence." However, given that theories of truth are not directly read off the world, but rather serve as parts of larger theories of behavior, this assumption is far from self-evident. A proper understanding of the role truth theories play in theories of interpretation makes the inscrutability of reference much less wide-spread than Davidson suggests, and, as a result, the radical interpretation methodology is much less likely to saddle its defenders with counterintuitive cases of indeterminacy than is commonly supposed|
|Keywords||Indeterminacy Interpretation Language Reference Truth Davidson, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter D. Klein (1986). Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
J. E. Malpas (1992). Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning: Holism, Truth, Interpretation. Cambridge University Press.
Timothy McCarthy (2002). Radical Interpretation and Indeterminacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
H. G. Callaway (1988). Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditional Semantics. Erkenntnis 28 (1):3 - 27.
Donald Davidson (2001). Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation: Philosophical Essays Volume 2. Clarendon Press.
Donald Davidson (1973). Radical Interpretation. Dialectica 27 (1):314-328.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Steven Gross (2012). Davidson, First-Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #51,653 of 722,863 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,863 )
How can I increase my downloads?