Review: Posted 10/5/99
| Abstract | JP argue that expressivists must admit that becoming competent with ethical utterances involves learning to make them only when one believes one has the relevant attitude. For expressivists hold that communicating our attitudes is the function of ethical utterances, in which case sincerity demands that we not utter an ethical sentence unless we believe we have the relevant attitude. So (b) is false, as long as we suppose that this commitment, as reflected in well-entrenched and clear-cut (henceforth, 'robust' abbreviates 'well-entrenched and clear-cut') conventions, means that ethical utterances express one's belief that one has the relevant attitude. This, in turn, means that (a) is false, if we grant that a belief expressed in virtue of such conventions provides the utterance's truth-conditions. | |||||||||
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James Dreier (2004). Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions. Analysis 64 (1):84–91.
Ruth Weintraub (2011). Logic For Expressivists. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):601 - 616.
Michael Ridge (2009). The Truth in Ecumenical Expressivism. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge.
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Lars Hertzberg (2011). “It Says What It Says”. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):589-603.
Ulvi Doğuoğlu (2007). Sense and Sensitivity. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:59-67.
Dorit Bar-On (2012). Expression, Truth, and Reality : Some Variations on Themes From Wright. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Tempered Expressivism. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Ernie Lepore & Herman Cappelen (2003). Context Shifting Arguments. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):25–50.
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