Online research in philosophy

Goffman is credited with enriching our understanding of the details of interaction, but not with challenging our theoretical understanding of social organization. While Goffman's position is not consistent, the outlines for a theory of an interaction order sui generis may be found in his work. It is not theoretically adequate to understand Goffman as an interactionist within the dichotomy between agency and social structure. Goffman offers a way of resolving this dichotomy via the idea of an interaction order which is constitutive of self and at the same time places demands on social structure. This has significant implications for our understanding of social organization in general.

On the dominant view of vagueness, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically, whether Harry is bald. In other words, vagueness is a type of indeterminacy. On the standard alternative, vagueness is a type of ignorance: if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then, even though it is metaphysically settled whether Harry is bald, we cannot know whether Harry is bald. On my view, vagueness is neither a type of indeterminacy nor a type of ignorance. Rather, it is sui generis.

My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach.

Simon Blackburn can be seen as challenging those committed to sui generis moral facts to explain the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive. We (like perhaps Derek Parfit) hold that normative facts in general are sui generis. We also hold that the normative supervenes on the descriptive, and we here endeavour to answer the generalization of Blackburn's challenge. In the course of pursuing this answer, we suggest that Frank Jackson's descriptivism rests on a conception of properties inappropriate to discussions of normativity, and we see reason to reject descriptivism generally. We also discuss the views of David Brink, Jonathan Dancy and Bernard Williams in this area.

Traditional cultural expressions are often unprotectable under existing intellectual property laws. While a sui generis approach may be appropriate for certain types of expressions and/or particular cultural communities, there may be adequate tenets embedded in current intellectual property laws and case law precedent to accommodate the needs of traditional cultures looking to protect their cultural expressions. The range of traditional cultural expressions is such that no one law - be it an existing Western law or sui generis law - will be adequate to address all the different types of cultures and expressions in existence. Case precedent from many jurisdictions and deference to specific tribal and aboriginal preferences will engender the most satisfactory results for these cultures, at least until there is adequate understanding amongst tribes and jurisdictions on an international level to create a sui generis law that is suitable for a majority of situations.

Simon Blackburn can be seen as challenging those committed to sui generis moral facts to explain the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive. We (like perhaps Derek Parfit) hold that normative facts in general are sui generis. We also hold that the normative supervenes on the descriptive, and we here endeavour to answer the generalization of Blackburn’s challenge. In the course of pursuing this answer, we suggest that Frank Jackson’s descriptivism rests on a conception of properties inappropriate to discussions of normativity, and we see reason to reject descriptivism generally. We also discuss the views of David Brink, Jonathan Dancy and Bernard Williams in this area.

With an aim to develop a public theology for an age of information media (or media theology), this article proposes a new God-concept: God is a communicative system sui generis that autopoietically processes meaning/information in the supratemporal realm via perfect divine media ad intra (Word/Spirit). For this task, Niklas Luhmann's systems theory is critically appropriated in dialogue with theology. First, my working postmetaphysical/epistemological stance is articulated as realistic operational constructivism and functionalism. Second, a series of arguments are advanced to substantiate the thesis: (1) God is an observing system sui generis ; (2) self-referential communication is divine operation; (3) unsurpassable complexity is divine mystery; (4) supratemporal autopoiesis of meaning is divine processing; (5) agape is the symbolic medium of divine communication. Third, this communicative model of God is developed into a trinitarian theology, with a claim that this model offers a viable alternative beyond the standard (psychic, social, process) models. Finally, some implications of this model are explored for constructive theology (conceiving creation as divine mediatization) and for science-and-religion in terms of derivative models: (1) God as a living system sui generis and (2) God as a meaning system sui generis.

Considers the impact of four European Court of Justice rulings, including British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Organisation Ltd (C-203/02), which examined the scope of the sui generis database right under European Parliament and Council Directive 96/9. Reviews the background to the legislation, the facts of the cases and the court's conclusions on the function of the sui generis right, the definition of a database, the criteria required for the purposes of protection, including the need to demonstrate substantial investment in obtaining and verifying data, and the position concerning extraction and re-utilisation of data.In November 2004, the Court of Justice gave its ruling in four related cases involving interpretation of the scope of the sui generis right introduced by Database Directive 96/9 to protect investment in making databases. The Court has in some respects construed the scope of the right broadly (definition of subject-matter and rights) and in others restrictively (protection requirement and infringement test). The most important aspect of the Court's ruling is that investment in creation of data does not trigger the sui generis right. Thus many databases consisting of created data (for example television listings, event data including sports fixtures, timetables, stock exchange data etc.) will generally remain unprotected. The decision is to be welcomed: it attempts to achieve a better balance between database producers' rights and public access to information by restricting the scope of the sui generis right, which had been criticised as being one of the most protective intellectual property rights on one of the least deserving subject-matters.

Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience.