David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 27 (2):200-227 (2012)
This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants: the shared-intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non-human primates. The central question raised by this model is whether sharing a goal with an agent is necessary and sufficient for ascribing it to that agent. I argue that advocates of the shared-intentionality model underestimate both the distinction between the target and the goal of a goal-directed action and the gap between sharing and ascribing a goal
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Michael E. Bratman (1992). Shared Cooperative Activity. Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
Gergely Csibra (2008). Goal Attribution to Inanimate Agents by 6.5-Month-Old Infants. Cognition 107 (2):705-717.
Gergely Csibra, György Gergely, Szilvia Bı́ró, Orsolya Koós & Margaret Brockbank (1999). Goal Attribution Without Agency Cues: The Perception of 'Pure Reason' in Infancy. Cognition 72 (3):237-267.
Jean Decety & Jessica A. Sommerville (2003). Shared Representations Between Self and Other: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience View. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (12):527-533.
Citations of this work BETA
Pierre Jacob (2013). How From Action-Mirroring to Intention-Ascription? Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1132-1141.
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