Self-quotation and self-knowledge

Synthese 110 (3):419-445 (1997)
  I argue that indirect quotation in the first person simple present tense (self-quotation) provides a class of infallible assertions. The defense of this conclusion examines the joint descriptive and constitutive functions of performative utterances and argues that a parallel treatment of belief ascription is in order. The parallel account yields a class of infallible belief ascriptions that makes no appeal to privileged modes of access. Confronting a dilemma formulated by Crispin Wright for theories of self-knowledge gives an epistemological setting for the account of infallible belief ascription
Keywords Assertion  Belief  Epistemology  Quotation  Representation  Self-knowledge  Truth  Wright, C
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004905327777
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