David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66 (2004)
Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, and to identify properties with functions from world, time pairs to extensions. Again, the replacement theory is neutral with respect to a metaphysical dispute that the old theory (arguably) forces us to take a stand on--the dispute over whether objects have temporal parts. It also allows us to give a smoother semantics for predication, to better accommodate our intuitions about which objects temporary properties are properties of, and to make temporally self-locating beliefs genuinely self -locating.
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Roger Harris (2010). How to Define Extrinsic Properties. Axiomathes 20 (4):461-478.
Andy Egan (2006). Secondary Qualities and Self-Location. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.
Brian Weatherson (2011). Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 155 (3):445-456.
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