The Inflexibility of Relative Truth

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):409-418 (2010)
Abstract
The ideology of relative truth is inflexible in two ways. Firstly, what's true-for-J is closed under entailment. This is a problem for using truth-relativism to solve the preface puzzle about knowledge. Secondly, it is plausible that vagueness gives rise to some questions having multiple ‘acceptable’ answers, and other questions having no ‘acceptable’ answer. Even if truth-relativism can express the former idea, it can't express the latter. I propose an ideology that is not so rigid. It is preferable to relative truth
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Dummett (1975). Wang's Paradox. Synthese 30 (3-4):201--32.
John MacFarlane (2005). The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. In Tamar Szabo Gendler John Hawthorne (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 197--234.
Mark Richard (2004). Contextualism and Relativism. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):215-242.

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