Truth vs. pretense in discourse about motion (or, why the sun really does rise)

Noûs 41 (2):298–317 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

These days it is widely agreed that there is no such thing as absolute motion and rest; the motion of an object can only be characterized with respect to some chosen frame of reference.1 This is a fact of which many of us are well-aware, and yet a cursory consideration of the ways we ascribe motion to objects gives the impression that it is a fact we persistently ignore. We insist to the police officer that we came to a full and complete stop at the stop sign, we fret that traffic is moving too slowly, we observe that the sun has dropped below the hills on the horizon, all without ever saying which frames of reference we have in mind.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
93 (#178,490)

6 months
9 (#250,037)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Brendan Balcerak Jackson
Bielefeld University

References found in this work

Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.
New horizons in the study of language and mind.Noam Chomsky - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
On Quantifier Domain Restriction.Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (2-3):219--61.

View all 18 references / Add more references