Graduate studies at Western
Cambridge University Press (1997)
|Abstract||Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology|
|Keywords||Intentionality (Philosophy Philosophy of mind|
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|Buy the book||$9.61 used (80% off) $29.93 new (38% off) $45.60 direct from Amazon (5% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||B105.I56.J33 1997|
|ISBN(s)||0521574013 0521574366 9780521574365|
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