What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World

Cambridge University Press (1997)
Abstract
Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology
Keywords Intentionality (Philosophy  Philosophy of mind
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Call number B105.I56.J33 1997
ISBN(s) 0521574013   0521574366   9780521574365
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Tuomas K. Pernu (2009). Is Knowledge a Natural Kind? Philosophical Studies 142 (3):371 - 386.

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