Ambiguous figures and the spatial contents of perceptual experience: a defense of representationalism [Book Review]
Graduate studies at Western
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346 (2011)
|Abstract||Representationalists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical with, or supervenes on, an aspect of its representational content. As such, representationalism could be disproved by a counter-example consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. In this paper, I discuss two recently proposed counter-examples to representationalism that involve ambiguous or reversible figures. I pursue two goals. My first, and most important, goal is to show that the representationalist can offer plausible responses to both counter-examples. My second goal is to show the implications of these responses for the nature of the spatial representational contents of perceptual experiences|
|Keywords||Perceptual experience Representationalism Spatial representational content Mach figure|
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