Being Positive About Negative Facts

Abstract
Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to want them around, including their roles in causation, chance-making and truth-making, and in constituting holes and edges.
Keywords Facts  Negative facts  Ontology  Truthmaking
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    Mark Jago (2011). Setting the Facts Straight. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):33-54.

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