Contextualism and the knowledge norm of assertion

Analysis 72 (3):491-498 (2012)
Abstract
Keith DeRose has argued that ‘the knowledge account of assertion – according to which what one is in a position to assert is what one knows – ... provides a ... powerful positive argument in favor of contextualism’ (2009: 80). The truth is that it yields a powerful argument against contextualism, at least against its most popular, anti-sceptical versions. The following argument shows that, if we conjoin (such versions of) epistemic contextualism with an appropriate meta-linguistic formulation of the knowledge account of assertion, contextualism cannot coherently be stated
Keywords contextualism  norms of assertion  Keith De Rose  Stewart Cohen  skepticism
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Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Jim Stone (2007). Contextualism and Warranted Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
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Jennifer Lackey (2011). Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 251--276.
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