Constructing worlds

Synthese 189 (1):59-74 (2012)
Abstract
You and I can differ in what we say, or believe, even though the things we say, or believe, are logically equivalent. Discussing what is said, or believed, requires notions of content which are finer-grained than sets of (metaphysically or logically) possible worlds. In this paper, I develop the approach to fine-grained content in terms of a space of possible and impossible worlds. I give a method for constructing ersatz worlds based on theory of substantial facts. I show how this theory overcomes an objection to actualist constructions of ersatz worlds and argue that it naturally gives rise to useful notions of fine-grained content.
Keywords Content  Hyperintensionality  Impossible worlds  Ersatz worlds  Modality
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2000). Logical Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.

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Edward N. Zalta (1997). A Classically-Based Theory of Impossible Worlds. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):640-660.
David H. Sanford (1998). Topological Trees: G H von Wright's Theory of Possible Worlds. In TImothy Childers (ed.), The Logica Yearbook. Acadamy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.
Francesco Berto (2013). Impossible Worlds. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013).
Theodore Sider (2002). The Ersatz Pluriverse. Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):279-315.
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