David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):131-158 (2009)
The logical omniscience problem, whereby standard models of epistemic logic treat an agent as believing all consequences of its beliefs and knowing whatever follows from what else it knows, has received plenty of attention in the literature. But many attempted solutions focus on a fairly narrow specification of the problem: avoiding the closure of belief or knowledge, rather than showing how the proposed logic is of philosophical interest or of use in computer science or artificial intelligence. Sentential epistemic logics, as opposed to traditional possible worlds approaches, do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack interesting epistemic properties. In this paper, I focus on the case of rule-based agents, which play a key role in contemporary AI research but have been neglected in the logical literature. I develop a framework for modelling monotonic, nonmonotonic and introspective rule-based reasoners which have limited cognitive resources and prove that the resulting models have a number of interesting properties. An axiomatization of the resulting logic is given, together with completeness, decidability and complexity results.
|Keywords||Epistemic logic Doxastic logic Rule-based agents Resource bounds Artificial intelligence Logical omniscience|
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References found in this work BETA
Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema (2002). Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press.
Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Jaakko Hintikka (1962). Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Mark Jago (2013). The Content of Deduction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):317-334.
Yacin Hamami (2015). The Interrogative Model of Inquiry Meets Dynamic Epistemic Logics. Synthese 192 (6):1609-1642.
Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada (2014). Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Implicit and Explicit Beliefs. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):107-140.
Ulf Hlobil (2016). Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):1-16.
Johan van Benthem & Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada (2010). The Dynamics of Awareness. Synthese 177 (1):5-27.
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