Epistemic logic for rule-based agents
Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1) (2009)
| Abstract | The logical omniscience problem, whereby standard models of epistemic logic treat an agent as believing all consequences of its beliefs and knowing whatever follows from what else it knows, has received plenty of attention in the literature. But many attempted solutions focus on a fairly narrow specification of the problem: avoiding the closure of belief or knowledge, rather than showing how the proposed logic is of philosophical interest or of use in computer science or artificial intelligence. Sentential epistemic logics, as opposed to traditional possible worlds approaches, do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack interesting epistemic properties. In this paper, I focus on the case of rule-based agents, which play a key role in contemporary AI research but have been neglected in the logical literature. I develop a framework for modelling monotonic, nonmonotonic and introspective rule-based reasoners which have limited cognitive resources and prove that the resulting models have a number of interesting properties. An axiomatization of the resulting logic is given, together with completeness, decidability and complexity results. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJohan van Benthem, Jelle Gerbrandy, Tomohiro Hoshi & Eric Pacuit (2009). Merging Frameworks for Interaction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5).
Antonio Moreno, Ulises Cortés & Ton Sales (2002). Subjective Situations and Logical Omniscience. Studia Logica 72 (1):7-29.
Guillaume Aucher (2010). An Internal Version of Epistemic Logic. Studia Logica 94 (1).
Natasha Alechina, Mark Jago & Brian Logan (2008). Preference-Based Belief Revision for Rule-Based Agents. Synthese 165 (2):159-177.
Jens Christian Bjerring (2010). Non-Ideal Epistemic Spaces. Dissertation, Australian National University
Mark Jago (2007). Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience. Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3).
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads33 ( #36,464 of 548,973 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,973 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
