Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience
Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3) (2007)
|Abstract||I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, which defenders of the ‘possible worlds’ approach are frequently critical of.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Matti Eklund & Daniel Kolak (2002). Is Hintikka's Logic First-Order? Synthese 131 (3):371 - 388.
M. J. Cresswell (2012). The World-Time Parallel: Tense and Modality in Logic and Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.
Nina Gierasimczuk & Jakub Szymanik (2007). Hintikka's Thesis Revisited. The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13:273.
M. J. Cresswell (1972). Intensional Logics and Logical Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1):2 - 15.
Jens Christian Bjerring (forthcoming). Impossible Worlds and Logical Omniscience: An Impossibility Result. Synthese.
Mark Jago (2006). Imagine the Possibilities: Information Without Overload. Logique Et Analyse 49 (196):345–371.
Jens Christian Bjerring (2010). Non-Ideal Epistemic Spaces. Dissertation, Australian National University
Mark Jago (2009). Epistemic Logic for Rule-Based Agents. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1).
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-02-12
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?