On one of the reasons for the indeterminacy of translation

Abstract
Quine's claim for the unavoidable indeterminacy of translation is partially supported by an argument based on the premise that the analytical hypotheses of the translator are underdetermined by the behavioural evidence on the strength of which they are asserted. I make three points about this argument. First, I show that quine's treatment of analytical hypotheses is inconsistent with his treatment of the hypotheses of physical science. Secondly, I argue that, Since no reason for this difference in treatment is given, Quine's argument fails to show why translation should be regarded as indeterminate but not, For example, Physical science. Thirdly, I claim that quine's argument should be rejected in any case since it depends on a sharp distinction between theory and observation which cannot be substantiated. I conclude that the argument from underdetermination provides no support for translational indeterminacy
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