David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 64 (2):187-212 (2010)
It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of shadows forces us to consider illumination as an additional dimension of phenomenal colors. For this purpose, I will first introduce two different interpretations of shadow-experiences, which Chalmers has called the simple and the complex interpretations, and show that they both fail to account for important phenomenal facts about shadow-experiences. I will then introduce my own alternative interpretation based on the idea that illumination is a dimension of phenomenal colors and explain how it can account for these facts.
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1996). Mental Paint and Mental Latex. Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
David J. Chalmers (2006). Perception and the Fall From Eden. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 49--125.
Austen Clark (2000). A Theory of Sentience. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Cohen (2008). Colour Constancy as Counterfactual. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.
Jonathan Cohen (2003). On the Structural Properties of the Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):78-95.
Citations of this work BETA
Todd Ganson (2013). Are Color Experiences Representational? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
René Jagnow (2012). Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):57 - 74.
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