Setting the facts straight

Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):33-54 (2011)
Substantial facts are not well-understood entities. Many philosophers object to their existence on this basis. Yet facts, if they can be understood, promise to do a lot of philosophical work: they can be used to construct theories of property possession and truthmaking, for example. Here, I give a formal theory of facts, including negative and logically complex facts. I provide a theory of reduction similar to that of the typed λ -calculus and use it to provide identity conditions for facts. This theory validates truthmaker maximalism : it provides truthmakers for all truths. I then show how the usual truth-in-a-model relation can be replaced by two relations: one between models and facts, saying that a given fact obtains relative to the model, and the other between facts and propositions: the truthmaking relation
Keywords Facts  States of affairs  Ontology  Negative facts  Properties  Truthmaking   λ-calculus  Reduction
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,570
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Mark Jago & Stephen Barker (2012). Being Positive About Negative Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
Mark Jago (2013). The Cost of Truthmaker Maximalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):460-474.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Greg Restall (2004). One Way to Face Facts. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):420–426.
Gunnar Björnsson (2007). If You Believe in Positive Facts, You Should Believe in Negative Facts. Hommage À Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
Colin Cheyne & Charles Pigden (2006). Negative Truths From Positive Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):249 – 265.
J. R. Lucas (1958). On Not Worshipping Facts. Philosophical Quarterly 8 (31):144-156.
Robin Stenwall (2010). Causal Truthmaking. Metaphysica 11 (2):211-222.
John Heil (2006). The Legacy of Linguisticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):233 – 244.
Kathrin Glüer (2012). Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International Pub.
Mark Jago & Stephen Barker (2012). Being Positive About Negative Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

118 ( #35,053 of 1,938,536 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #42,133 of 1,938,536 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.