David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 121 (484):903-918 (2012)
Amongst those who feel the pull of the truthmaker principle (that truths require for their truth a truthmaker to exist), there is disagreement as to whether it applies to all truths or merely to some distinguished subset. Those in the latter camp, the non-maximalists, argue that there are no ducks in my bath is true not because of something’s existence, but because of the lack of ducks in my bath. Maximalists, by contrast, insist that truths are made true by something’s existence, and so appear to be committed to strange ‘negative’ entities in their ontology. As a consequence, non-maximalists appear to have a more common-sense ontology than maximalists. But things are not so straightforward. I will argue that if maximalism is committed to strange entities then so is non-maximalism; and if non-maximalism can do without strange entities, then so can maximalism. Either way, the non-maximalist has no ontological advantage over the maximalist
|Keywords||Truthmaking Truthmaker maximalism Truth Ontology|
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Tallant (2009). Ontological Cheats Might Just Prosper. Analysis 69 (3):422-430.
Citations of this work BETA
Mark Jago (2013). Impossible Worlds. Noûs 47 (3):713-728.
Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram (2015). Nefarious Presentism. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):355-371.
Sam Baron (2015). Tensed Truthmaker Theory. Erkenntnis 80 (5):923-944.
Aaron M. Griffith (2015). How Negative Truths Are Made True. Synthese 192 (1):317-335.
Alexander Skiles (2014). Is There a Dilemma for the Truthmaker Non-Maximalist? Synthese 191 (15):3649-3659.
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