Can semantics be syntactic?

Synthese 82 (3):309-28 (1990)
  The author defends John R. Searle's Chinese Room argument against a particular objection made by William J. Rapaport called the Korean Room. Foundational issues such as the relationship of strong AI to human mentality and the adequacy of the Turing Test are discussed. Through undertaking a Gedankenexperiment similar to Searle's but which meets new specifications given by Rapaport for an AI system, the author argues that Rapaport's objection to Searle does not stand and that Rapaport's arguments seem convincing only because they assume the foundations of strong AI at the outset
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Epistemology  Semantics  Rapaport, W  Searle, J
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413879
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References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1967). The Logical Structure of the World. Berkeley, University of California Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
William Rapaport (2011). Yes, She Was! Minds and Machines 21 (1):3-17.

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